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A computational model for the distribution of wealth among the members of an ideal society is
presented. It is determined that a realistic distribution of wealth depends upon two mechanisms: an
asymmetric flux of wealth in trading transactions that advantages the poorer of the two traders and
a non-stationary creation and destruction of individual wealth. The former mechanism redistributes
wealth by reducing the gap between the rich and poor, leading to the emergence of a middle class.
The latter mechanism, together with the former one, generates a distribution of wealth having a
power-law tail that is compatible with Pareto’s law.
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More than a century ago the Italian sociologist and
economist, Vilfredo Pareto, studied the distribution of
income among people of different western countries and
found an inverse power law [1]. The cumulative proba-
bility P (w) of people whose income is at least w seemed
to vary as P (w) ∝ w−α. Pareto mistakenly believed that
the exponent α was universal constant with an approxi-
mate value of α = 1.5 [2]. In our discussion we use the
terms distribution of income and distribution of wealth
interchangeably, and although the two distributions may
not exactly coincide, they are in fact strongly dependent
on one another. The distinction between the two will
not influence the conclusions drawn from the dynamical
models of economic interactions we present here.
Societies in the West have historically been partitioned
into three classes; the poor, the middle and the rich. The
relative size of each class is determined by somewhat arbi-
trarily assigned levels of income, but it is safe to say that
the smallest class is the rich and for a stable society the
largest is the middle class. This partitioning must be in-
corporated into any mathematical model describing how
wealth is distributed within a society. The inverse power
law of Pareto does not have this characteristic partition-
ing, because the derivative of a power law is still a power
law. According to data, across the full range of income,
we should expect the probability density function (pdf)
p(w) to increase at low income, reach a maximum and, fi-
nally, decrease with increasing wealth. Moreover, fitting
the cumulative probability P (w) instead of the pdf p(w)
will certainly mask important properties of the dynamics
of the economy. Therefore, herein we model the density
function p(w). The cumulative probability P (w) is re-
lated to the pdf p(w) via the relation P (w) =
∫
∞
w
p(x)dx.
We investigate a computational model of the distribu-
tion of wealth, which is based on the assumption that
the pdf of wealth is the result of a non-stationary to-
tal wealth and asymmetric trading mechanisms in the
economy. For a non-stationary economy we postulate a
situation in which the total wealth of a society is not con-
served, since an individual may create or consume wealth.
For an asymmetric trading economy we postulate a mech-
anism by which, through trades, wealth randomly moves
from one individual to another, but in such a way as to,
on average, slightly advantage the poorer trader in the
exchange.
Wealth decays because of human consumption and
needs to be continuously recreated through work and
human creativity. People must work to live! The mech-
anisms that regulate the creation and consumption of
wealth are neither identical nor symmetric, and they do
not compensate exactly for one another. This lack of
compensation implies that the wealth of an individual,
even in the absence of any type of trade, fluctuates in
time. Individual wealth may increase or decrease accord-
ing to the situation. Moreover, also the assumption that
all transactions occur at precisely the right price, a fact
that implies the absence of any flux of wealth between
traders, is unrealistic. Some sellers are more persuasive
and some buyers are more discerning than others. There
are good and bad deals. Therefore, the proper value of
an asset may be lower or higher than the price paid for
it. This dynamic of a transaction continuously generates
a random flux of wealth from one trader to the other in
every transaction.
Finally, we assume that this random flux of wealth dur-
ing a transaction depends upon the difference in wealth
between the two traders and may be statistically biased
toward the poorer partner. This mechanism seems to be
needed to redistribute the wealth among people. More
importantly, without this mechanism, it would be true
that the rich would get richer and the poor would get
poorer. But this latter flux of wealth from the poor to
the rich would be a consequence of the excess wealth of
the rich and not the result of any hypothetical economic
abuses of the poor by the rich. In a fair game in which
the rich and the poor have the same probability to win
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or lose in any transaction involving one of each class,
the rich ultimately win because of their larger resources
[3]. So for a society to avoid the rich getting too rich
and the poor getting too poor with the fallout of a social
collapse, the poor must be slightly advantaged in their
transactions with the rich.
The symmetry-breaking mechanism that advantages
the poor, in their transactions with the rich, should be
thought to be both a necessity for, and a consequence
of, an efficient and stable society. In fact, the neces-
sity to slightly advantage the poor requires a policy of
rights and freedom, balanced by duties and responsibil-
ities, that has been typical of western societies. For ex-
ample, in a modern democratic society the right of the
employed worker to be protected by a union is recog-
nized, as is their right to strike against their employers
in particular cases. These rights allow the workers to ob-
tain a salary statistically higher than the real value of
their job, compatible to the actual economy. In the same
way, the freedom to decide the price of their own goods
is not only an incentive to a larger and better produc-
tion of goods, but allows the self-employed of the work-
ing class to statistically increase the price of their own
products. In fact, many such workers are farmers, fish-
ermen and small scale artisans, who produce the basic
needs of a society, for example, food. Even the richest
person needs to eat, therefore, if he/she cannot enslave
the farmer and wants to eat, he/she must buy food at the
price the farmer decides. We understand that the eco-
nomic situation is much more complex than we are able
to detail here, but the policy of rights and freedom in
an economic context contributes the symmetry-breaking
mechanism in our model as we describe.
In the physics tradition we hypothesize a mathemat-
ical model describing the economic mechanisms in an
idealized situation, predict the resulting distribution of
wealth and then compare the predicted distribution func-
tion with data [4,5]. The correctness of our assumptions
are ultimately determined by data and not logical dis-
course. In all our simulations we suppose an economic
society of 10,000 agents, who at the onset have the same
degree of wealth. We calculate the wealth pdf, p(w), of
our hypothetical society after 100 million random trans-
actions between all agents. We proceed by steps, intro-
ducing models of increasing complexity and discussing
the consequences of each of them in turn. The first three
models assume the conservation of total wealth, while
the last model assumes that the total wealth of a society
may change.
Perfect trade price. The simplest hypothesis is to
suppose that wealth cannot be created or destroyed and
that all transactions between agents occur at the right
price. This complete symmetry means that each agent
acquires the exact same amount of wealth that is given
up to the other trader. The model is based upon the
assumption that the price of an asset is defined by its
intrinsic value. Consequently the wealth of each agent
remains constant and the final distribution of a closed
society’s wealth remains identical to the initial uniform
distribution. This model is clearly at odds with our ex-
perience of the economic world.
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FIG. 1. Symmetric, stationary economy. The wealth is
measured in units of the poorest agent’s wealth.
Random symmetric trade price. Again we sup-
pose that wealth cannot be created or destroyed, however
we now assume that the transactions between agents may
occur at a price that randomly fluctuates around a hypo-
thetical ideal value. Therefore, the wealth of each agent
may increase or decrease according to whether he/she
makes good or bad deals. We still assume symmetry,
that is, both agents have the same chance to win or lose,
such as in a coin toss. We also suppose that the maxi-
mum wealth that may move from one agent to the other,
in a single transaction, is limited to some fraction of the
wealth of the poorer of the two traders. This restrictive
condition is required because only in a robbery is it re-
alistic to assume that a person will give over to another
more wealth than he/she possesses.
Fig. 1 shows the pdf of wealth among the agents af-
ter 100 million random transactions. It is a very wide
inverse power law of the type p(w) ∝ 1/w. The fraction
of wealth that moves from one agent to the other in a
single transaction is assumed to vary between 0% and
50% of the poorer agent’s wealth. Fig. 1 shows that the
distance in wealth between the richest and the poorest
is huge. Practically, the entire wealth of society con-
centrates in the hand of very few people. In fact, even if
both agents in a transaction have the same chance to win
or lose, the risk for the rich trader is smaller because if
he/she loses, the loss is a smaller fraction of his/her own
wealth than that which the poorer agent may lose. Con-
sequently, there is a high probability in this model that
a very few people accumulate almost the entire wealth
available and the others become extremely poor, as Fig.
1 shows. An ideal society that adopts such a trading
policy will ultimately collapse.
Random asymmetric trade price. The third
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model assumes that the poorer of the two traders is
slightly advantaged in the trade, and has a greater chance
to formulate a good deal. In practice, we implement this
ability to make a good deal by assuming that if wp and
wr are the wealth of the poorer and the richer of the
two traders, respectively, the probability for the poorer
trader to profit is
Π = 0.5 + f
wr − wp
wr + wp
, (1)
where 0 ≤ f ≤ 0.5 is the asymmetry flux index. Eq. (1)
assumes that if the two agents have the same degree of
wealth, they have the same chance to get a good deal,
while if one trader is much richer than the other, the
poorer is advantaged with the maximum probability of
Π = 0.5 + f .
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FIG. 2. Asymmetric, stationary economy. f is the flux
index. The wealth is in units of the poorest agent’s wealth.
In the computer simulations shown in Fig. 2, we cal-
culate three different situations with f = 0.10, f = 0.15
and f = 0.25, and the fraction of wealth that may move
in the transaction is assumed to vary between 0% and
10% of the poorer agent’s wealth. We determine that
these computer-generated wealth pdf, as Fig. 2 shows,
are very well fit by curves of the form
p(w) = a wγ exp(− b wδ) . (2)
Fig. 2 shows that with this model the economy of a
society does not collapse as it did in the previous case.
The random asymmetric trade price model yields a sta-
ble distribution of wealth, p(w), well fitted by (2). The
present model leads to a partitioning of society into three
parts: poor, middle and rich classes, where the middle
is the largest class followed by the poor and finally the
rich. The economic gap between richest and poorest is
not unrealistically wide, as it was in the random sym-
metric model. If the curves of Fig. 2 seem unrealistic,
it is because the gap in the wealth between the richest
and poorest is too small! However, the figure shows that
the separation in wealth between the rich and poor in-
creases by decreasing the asymmetric flux index f and
a more realistic distribution with an exponential-like tail
may emerge by decreasing this parameter.
In summary, the random asymmetric trade price model
produces a stable wealth pdf that may be fitted by func-
tions of the type of Eq. (2). The only difficulty with this
model is that it does not reproduce many experimental
data, like those analyzed by Pareto, which suggest an in-
verse power-law distribution that is not fitted by Eq. (2).
We shall show that this failure is due to the assumption
that society’s total wealth remains constant.
Random asymmetric trade price with nonsta-
tionary wealth. Our last computational model imple-
ments the mechanism of the previous model with the
additional property that the total wealth is not constant.
The wealth of each individual trader is subject to a ran-
dom destruction-creation dynamics, due to the natural
ebb and flow of wealth through human creativity, work
and investment. We introduce the non-stationary mecha-
nism through a risk index r > 0, that measures the stan-
dard deviation of the destruction-creation wealth process.
In our computer simulation we assume that after every
10,000 transactions the wealth of each trader is reinitial-
ized by the following expression
wi(t+ 1) = (1 + r ξ) wi(t) , (3)
where wi(t) is the wealth of the i-th agent after the t-th
epoch and wi(t + 1) is that agent’s wealth at the start
of the new epoch, t + 1. Finally, ξ is a zero-centered
Gaussian random variable with unit variance. The rare
instances of too negative a random value of the variable
ξ, that makes the wealth w(i) negative, are neglected.
Fig. 3a shows the distribution of wealth for three com-
puter simulations obtained by assuming a fixed risk in-
dex r = 0.1 and varying the asymmetry flux index f :
f = 0.10, f = 0.15 and f = 0.30. Fig. 3b shows another
three computer simulations obtained by assuming a fixed
asymmetry flux index f = 0.1 and varying the risk index,
r = 0.05, r = 0.10 and r = 0.15. The fraction of wealth
that may move between agents in a single transaction is
assumed again to vary between 0% and 10% of the poorer
agent’s wealth. Finally, Figs. 3a and 3b show that the
computer-generated wealth pdf can be well fitted for a
very large region by curves of the form
p(w) = a wγ/(1 + b w)γ+δ . (4)
As in the previous model, we obtain a stable wealth
distribution p(w) that partitions society into the three
classes. The wealth gap between the richest and poor-
est increases by decreasing the asymmetric flux index f
and/or by increasing the risk index r.
We stress that Eq. (4) is characterized by an inverse
power-law tail of the type p(w) ∝ 1/wδ, where δ is the
inverse power-law exponent. This inverse power-law dis-
tribution is compatible with Pareto’s measurements. In
fact, Fig. 4 shows the cumulative probability P (w) for
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an economy with f = 0.15 and r = 0.075, fitted with
the Pareto distribution and having a Pareto exponent of
α = δ− 1 = 1.48. This figure is consistent with the fit to
U.S. income data made in Figure 35 of Ref. [2].
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FIG. 3. Asymmetric, non-stationary economy. (a) The risk
index is r = 0.1; the fit gives: δ = 1.76± 0.05, δ = 2.1± 0.05,
δ = 3.3 ± 0.2. (b)The flux index is f = 0.1; the fit gives:
δ = 3.2± 0.1, δ = 1.76± 0.03, δ = 1.44± 0.02. The wealth is
measured in units of the poorest agent’s wealth.
A society that allows a small class of people to ab-
sorb all its wealth is unstable and will either collapse
economically, or be destroyed by revolution. This may
also happen in the absence of economic exploitation of
the poor by the rich, as we explained above. A stable so-
ciety requires that the poor have an advantage in trans-
actions with the wealthy and are protected by particular
rights and marketing freedom. On the other hand, in
a real human society, wealth does not only move ran-
domly from one individual to another through trades,
but is continuously created and destroyed through an in-
dividual’s work, creativity and investment. The human
aspiration of personal riches requires a positive risk in-
dex r that generates both a large middle class and a small
rich class, when applied across the society. The asymme-
try flux index f and the risk index r express the human
need to share and the human need to create, respectively.
Therefore, we conclude from the model that both mech-
anisms must be present to some degree in any human
society that functions effectively and remains stable. In
fact, when these two mechanisms are present, according
to our model, the wealth pdf assumes the inverse power-
law distribution of Pareto at the high income end, and,
more realistically, still retains a small but finite popula-
tion at the low income end.
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FIG. 4. Cumulative probability for an asymmetric,
non-stationary economy. f = 0.15, r = 0.075. The Pareto’s
exponent is α = 1.48 ± 0.02.
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